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Abstract
Trust decisions made in the social world have important consequences for decision makers,
such as financial and/or social losses. Given the importance of these decisions, psychologists
often ask what variables lead to trust. The most commonly studied predictor variable is the
degree of similarity between participants and their interaction partners. Here we ask how a
more visible cue, social reciprocity, affects trust decisions in concert with similarity. We use
a “chat-room” style task to independently manipulate the degree to which participants are
similar to a set of avatars that they believe are other players and the degree to which those
avatars display social reciprocity. We then assess trust decisions in both financial and social
domains. Our results show that together with similarity, social reciprocity is an important
independent predictor of trust decisions. This work has implications for understanding how
and when trust is allocated, as well how to facilitate successful interactions.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction
Decisions about whether to trust another person, and their subsequent effects on

behaviour are critical elements of the social environment. At the core of these decisions
are the factors upon which people base interpersonal judgments. As with decisions in the
cognitive domain, people rely on heuristics to make social decisions quickly, efficiently,
and often, with little information about the true trustworthiness of their social partners
(Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). For example, people may use the degree to which they
perceive themselves to be similar to an interaction partner when making trust-based
decisions. Because humans naturally attend to this type of social information (Wood,
1996), it likely guides the application of heuristics in the social decision-making process.
The most frequently studied behavioural predictor of interpersonal decisions is the
degree to which two people are similar to one another. Researchers have examined
similarity across a variety of contexts and choice types, such as negotiation outcomes
(Wilson, DeRue, Matta, Howe, & Conlon, 2016) and romantic partner selection
(Campbell, Chin, & Stanton, 2016; Tidwell, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2013). Findings from
this work broadly suggest that as the similarity between oneself and one’s interaction
partners increases, one is more likely to like, cooperate with, and trust those partners
(Fischer, 2009; Lui, Ngo, & Hon, 2006). Thus, high levels of similarity positively
influence interpersonal perception (Bagues & Perez-Villadoniga, 2013)
Researchers often operationalize and manipulate interpersonal similarity using
group membership (e.g., Chen & Kenrick, 2002; Vang & Fox, 2013). Specifically, people
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who are similar to the self on some experimentally salient dimension (e.g., race, sex,
location of origin, team assignment, university) are classified as in-group members and
those who are dissimilar on that dimension become the out-group (e.g., Appiah,
Knobloch-Westerwick, & Alter, 2013). Evidence from this work largely shows that
people are much more likely to like, cooperate with and trust in-group relative to outgroup members, partially because they are more similar with respect to the experimental
context (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014)
One common operationalization of trust decisions in group-dynamics research is
the degree to which participants are willing to cooperate (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman,
1995). This is an obvious dependent variable because of the natural relationship between
cooperation and trust; to cooperate with another person, one must place trust in that
person. This means work that investigates the effects of similarity on cooperation can
also inform how similarity impacts trust.
In experimental contexts, similarity generally promotes cooperative behaviours.
For example, in an economic trust game, people who interact with a person of another
race return less money than people who interact with a person of the same race (Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). Thus, physical or appearance-related similarity
increases trust behaviours (e.g., DeBruine, 2002; DeBruine, 2005). Research has also
indicated that people with similar interests are more likely to trust one another. For
instance, Ziegler and Golbeck (2007) have reported that people who have similar tastes in
film and literature trust one another more than people with dissimilar film/literature taste.
In real-world business contexts, similarities between firms lead to increased trust, which
results in decreased use of coercive strategies (Lui, Ngo, & Hon, 2006). These findings,
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amongst others, suggest that similarity leads to incremental increases in trust and trustrelated behaviours.
There are several mechanisms that may underpin the similarity-trust relationship.
One such mechanism is evolutionary. Grounded in “kin selection” hypotheses, this idea
suggests that because people frequently cooperate with and trust close relatives, who
resemble themselves in appearance, people may use appearance as a signal to indicate
trustworthiness (Farmer, McKay, & Tsakiris, 2013; Krupp, DeBruine, & Barclay, 2008).
Findings suggest that people compute a “kinship index”, which indicates potential
relatedness and consequently trustworthiness (Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007).
When the level of kinship, or the level of similarity in appearance increases, so does
cooperative behaviour (Griffin & West, 2003). This means that increases in appearance
similarity serve as a proxy for relatedness, thereby facilitating cooperation, altruistic
behaviour, and trust (DeBruine, 2002; Krupp, DeBruine, & Barclay, 2007).
Another mechanism that may underpin the similarity-trust association comes from
the literature on relationship formation. Specifically, people who share interests, attitudes,
and personality features are more likely to like each other than people who do not share
these attributes (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Rushton & Bons, 2005;
Youyou, Stillwell, Schwartz, & Kosinski, 2017). Thus, similarity may provide a footing
upon which people can form close bonds, such as friendships and marriages. It is not
surprising then that people trust those who are more similar to themselves on such
dimensions than less similar individuals (Simons, 2008). Likewise, attitude similarity
may be a heuristic cue for kinship (Park & Schaller, 2005), which further supports the
idea that attitude similarity leads to trust.
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A third explanation for the similarity-trust relationship comes from the literature
on “fluency effects” (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmier, 2011; Whittlesea & LeBoe, 2000).
The presence of similarity may make it easier to trust someone because similar attitudes
and beliefs are more easily accessible. For example, people use their own attitudes and
behaviours to interpret the attitudes and behaviours of those around them (Gordon, 1992),
leading to easier recall of thoughts and attitudes, more accurate predictions of future
behaviour, and increased positivity toward similar others. A recent functional imaging
study supports this idea showing that people use the self as a reference when inferring
others’ states and traits (Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008). The authors concluded that
people tend to attribute their perceptions of others’ trustworthiness to shared similarity
(Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008), likely enhancing perceived trust in the process
(Krueger, 1998; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus, the ease or fluency with which people
interpret others’ behaviour may be a heuristic that people use when making trust
decisions.
Interestingly, similarity need not be objectively present in order to achieve these
effects. Rather, the mere perception of similarity is enough to convey benefits. For
example, a naturalistic longitudinal study, found that greater levels of perceived
similarity upon first meeting a new freshman undergraduate roommate led to more trust
over time (Whitmore & Dunsmore, 2014). Other researchers have found that perceived
similarity between nurses and patients is associated with improved patient satisfaction;
from which they deduce that high levels of perceived similarity between community
health workers and patients likely improves patient trust as well (Sanders, Winters, &
Fiscella, 2015). Moreover, when people perceive greater levels of similarity in others
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(e.g., using manipulated facial photos), they show higher levels of cooperation and
trustworthy behaviour (DeBruine, 2002).
Taken together, this evidence suggests that similarity appears to be a reliable
predictor of cooperation and trusting behaviour. Indeed, the effects of similarity
manipulations replicate across various naturalistic and experimental settings using a
variety of methods. Although we are confident that similarity relates to trust and
cooperation, this body of research is not without its limitations. Specifically, similarity is
often studied in a naturalistic or correlational manner (e.g., Glaeser, et al., 2000; Lui, et
al., 2006; Whitmore & Dunsmore, 2014), meaning that other variables may be driving
reported effects. Moreover, researchers often manipulate similarity along race or gender
categories (e.g., Chen & Kenrick, 2002; Vang & Fox, 2013), meaning that stereotypes
against obvious out-group members might be responsible for results, rather than
similarity. Therefore, the extent to which similarity underpins research findings remains
unclear.
Much of the literature on trust decisions has assumed that similarity underpins
decisions to trust, based on evidence showing that minimal group manipulations (e.g.,
same versus rival-university students (Montoya & Pittinsky, 2011)) enhance trust
decisions. However, in the real world, these cause-effect relationships may be more
complicated. For example, one may actively seek evidence of similarity with a social
partner when one experiences trustworthy, fair, or cooperative behaviour. This, in turn,
may lead to increased perceptions of similarity that stem from a tendency to minimize,
not notice, or to forget differences. Indeed, in a clever paradigm in which participants
invested with computerized trustees depicted by photographs, Farmer, McKay and
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Tsakiris (2014), found that participants perceived trustworthy trustees as showing greater
appearance similarity to themselves than untrustworthy trustees. Thus, it appears that
perceived similarity leads to trust and trustworthy behaviour leads to perceived similarity.
Without a strong objective manipulation of similarity levels, it is difficult to
discern cause from effect in the similarity-trust relationship. Thus, it is currently
impossible to determine whether similarity leads to trust or vice versa. Moreover, given
that many trust decisions play out in real interpersonal environments, other social or
interaction-level factors may have clear and important causal roles in understanding the
development of trust decisions. Here we take the view that the quality of a social
interaction independently contributes to trust decisions. Specifically, we examine how
reciprocity of social behaviour (e.g., returning a social partner’s smile, nod or gesture)
contributes to decisions to trust.
Social reciprocity is important for three reasons. First, this factor is strongly
apparent in face-to-face social interactions (Heerey & Kring, 2007; Heerey & Crossley,
2013), including those that culminate in trust decisions. Second, reciprocity of an
interaction is apparent nearly immediately, meaning that it is the first social cue one
receives about their interaction partner. It is likely then that social reciprocity colours our
interpretation of other social cues that occur later in the interaction sequence. Third,
decisions to trust engender reciprocity norms (Pillutla, Malhotra, & Muringhan, 2003).
That is, when people engage in acts of trust, they expect that their trustees will
reciprocate this trust in kind (Malhotra, 2004). Thus, reciprocity of social behaviour may
serve to communicate a social partner’s trustworthiness by providing information about
the stability of the social environment (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushmore, 2008;
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Behrens, Hunt, & Rushmore, 2009) and consequently the likelihood of social norm
compliance.
Behavioural mimicry, the inadvertent imitation of an interaction partner’s
nonverbal behaviour or verbal style (Duffy & Chartrand, 2015), is one operational
definition of social reciprocity. Mimicry between interaction partners predicts increased
liking, cooperation, and trust (Duffy & Chartrand, 2015; Fischer et al., 2013; Lakin &
Chartrand, 2003; Seibt, Mühlberger, Likowksi, & Weyers, 2015). For example, in a study
of interpersonal negotiations, individuals who engaged in mimicry were more likely to
achieve successful outcomes than those who did not. Interestingly, this did not lead to
negative outcomes for the person being mimicked. Rather, mimicry had an overall
positive effect within the dyad (Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky 2008). Research has also
consistently indicated that participants like and trust people and avatars, who mimic more
than those who do not mimic (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Seibt
et al., 2015). Mimicry may therefore be influential in creating rapport and bolstering
interpersonal connections (Seibt et al., 2015).
In real face-to-face interactions, instances of mimicry are a subset of a broader
class of reciprocal social behaviours. Reciprocity refers to the active exchange of social
information and may refer to verbal and nonverbal behaviours or feelings (Heerey &
Crossley, 2013; King-Casas, et al., 2005). For example, evidence shows that people
commonly exchange smiles in face-to-face encounters (Heerey & Crossley, 2013) and
that people report greater liking for others who indicate liking for them (Montoya &
Horton, 2012). Note that reciprocity is not necessarily positive. Indeed, in competitive
encounters in which one player defects, other players often follow a “tit for tat” strategy,
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mutually reciprocating defection or punishment (Axelrod, 1980; Van Lange & Visser,
1999). While this strategy may be effective in the prisoner’s dilemma or other laboratory
cooperation games (e.g., Duersch, Oechssler, & Schipper, 2014) it can be suboptimal in
real-world social situations, such as the presence of conflict in the workplace (Andersson
& Pearson, 1999)
Reciprocity of behaviour and liking in face-to-face interactions may subsequently
support the development of trust and cooperation. For example, without adequate levels
of low-level behavioural reciprocity (e.g., nodding, smiling), an interaction may feel
disfluent, awkward and uncomfortable (Delaherche et al., 2012), leading to poor
outcomes, including reduced trust and willingness to cooperate with the social partner
(Launay, Dea, & Bailes, 2013). Moreover, when reciprocal behaviours are tightly
coupled in time, known as social synchrony (Delaherche et al., 2012), social interactions
result in greater levels of rapport, cooperation, and overall perceptions of conversational
“smoothness.”
A growing body of research has suggested that temporal synchronization between
interaction partners leads to an increase in cooperation (Kirschner & Tomasello, 2010;
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). For example, it may precede
the development of prosocial behaviour, cooperation, and positive emotion (Chartrand &
Lakin, 2013), as well as feelings of trust toward an interaction partner (Launay, Dean, &
Bailes, 2013). Interestingly, temporal synchronization may spontaneously emerge when
participants are asked to work cooperatively rather than competitively on a task (Bernieri,
Davis, Rosenthal, & Knee, 1994), suggesting that people may treat the presence of
temporal synchrony as a signal of cooperation. Thus, social synchrony, as with mimicry
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and reciprocity, tends to have positive effects within dyads including increased rapport
and feeling of smoothness or coordination during interaction (Wiltermuth & Heath,
2009).
Although interesting, the current mimicry literature suffers from several
limitations. Chief among these is whether the observed mimicry is actually genuine
mimicry. Specifically, whereas mimicry is the automatic and unintentional imitation of
another’s behaviour (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008), it is not uncommon for
researchers to code an instance of mimicry 10 or more seconds from the initiating
behaviour and when the initiating behavour is no longer observable (e.g., Stel & Vonk,
2010). Because interactions are extremely fast-paced and social cues may be fleeting
(Yan, Wu, Liang, Chen, & Fu, 2013), the contingency between the initiating and
response behaviours may be weak or non-existent by the time 10 seconds have elapsed.
For example, the likelihood of smile reciprocity within unmanipulated interactions
reaches asymptotic levels by approximately 4 seconds (Heerey & Crossley, 2013). In
addition to the overlong time lapse, researchers also frequently instruct participants to
mimic one another. Since real mimicry is automatic, unconscious, and unintentional
(Seibt et al., 2015), this may lead to artificial or contrived interactions which differ on
other characteristics besides the presence or absence of mimicry.

1.1

Present Experiments

Here, we are interested in how both similarity and social reciprocity shape
interpersonal perception and subsequent trust-based decision-making. Because we treat
similarity and reciprocity as independent variables, we use a minimal social context in
which it is possible to reliably manipulate them. Specifically, participants in the present
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experiments “interacted” with avatars, which they believed to be other participants, in the
context of an online chat-room style environment.
This work comprises three independent experiments. The purpose of the set of
experiments was to examine how objective similarity between interaction partners, as
well as social reciprocity, influence participants’ trust decisions. To manipulate objective
similarity, we asked participants to respond to 20 questions that concern frequently
exchanged information during the getting acquainted process (e.g., “Are you originally
from Canada?”). We then allowed participants to exchange this information with a set of
avatars that they believed were other participants. To manipulate similarity, the avatars’
responses matched participants’ responses with either high or low frequency. Our social
reciprocity manipulation relied on the exchange of emojis (e.g., ) as a form of
behavioural exchange during participants’ “interactions” with the avatars. A reciprocal
interaction took place when an avatar’s emoji feedback matched that given by a
participant (Chapter 2 provides additional detail).
We measured trust in different ways across the experiments. In Experiment 1, we
used a simple economic game, based on a “centipede game” (Rosenthal, 1981) in which
two players take turns deciding whether to steal a pot of money or to pass it to their
opponent. The money (and therefore the incentive for defection) doubles with each pass
so participants should engage in a greater number of passes with opponents they believe
to be trustworthy, relative to those they believe to be untrustworthy. In Experiments 2a
and 2b, we measured trust with a classic investor/trustee game (Berg, Dickhaut, &
McCabe, 1995). In an investor/trustee game, players are assigned to the investor or the
trustee role on each round. The investor must make an investment ranging from 0% to
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100% of an endowment they have received. The investment then “matures” and the
trustee must choose which proportion of the matured investment (0% to 100%) to return
to the investor. The amount invested indicates the degree to which an investor trusts a
trustee whereas the return amount indicates the trustee’s actual trustworthiness.
In our third experiment, we examine the degree to which manipulated similarity
and reciprocity contribute to the “utility” or subjective desirability of another player as
the target of a trust interaction. Here, we rely on a utility task in which participants
choose amongst pairs of avatars for trust-related interactions (see Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944). Because participants respond to all possible avatar pairings several
times, participants’ choices allow us to estimate the independent contributions of
similarity and reciprocity in trust-related decision-making, as well as their interaction.
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Chapter 2

2

General Methodology
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 used exactly the same manipulation of similarity and

reciprocity. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the details of these manipulations,
along with the questionnaires used in the protocol. Because we measured trust differently
depending on the experiment, trust measurement will be described within each
experimental chapter.

2.1 General Protocol
Participants arrived to the lab in groups of five for a study “about how people get
to know one another in an online environment.” In reality, participation in this study was
independent and participants interacted with computerized avatars. We used
computerized avatars, rather than a naturalistic interaction, because this was the only way
to experimentally manipulate both similarity and social reciprocity and to ensure that the
manipulation was identical across participants (Heerey, 2015; Schilbach et al., 2006).
However, it was essential to our experimental design that participants believed they were
actually becoming acquainted with real people. Inviting them to the lab in groups helped
us to achieve this deception.
Once a group of participants arrived at the lab, they were seated in individual testing
rooms for the duration of the experiment. After consenting to the study procedure (see
Appendix B), participants selected one of 16 possible avatar images (8 female and 8
male) to represent them for the duration the experiment (see Figure 1). The avatar set
consisted of vector graphics and was rated by an independent set of participants to
determine the degree to which they were visually similar across avatars. After
participants selected an avatar, the computer told them that another player had already
selected their choice. The computer then asked them to select a second avatar, which was
always allocated to the participant. The participant’s first choice of avatar always
appeared in the experiment as one of the highly similar avatars. Pilot testing suggested
that this procedure enhanced the believability of the experiment. The computer selected
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the other three avatars with which participants interacted based on pre-rated similarity in
appearance. One of these avatars was always highly similar in appearance to the
participant’s own avatar. The remaining two avatars had been pre-rated as low in
appearance similarity to the participant’s own avatar.

2.2
Similarity
Manipulation
To manipulate objective
similarity, we first asked
participants to respond to 20
“getting-acquainted” type
questions (see Appendix C).
Four of these items were highvalue “attitude” questions (i.e.,
“Would you consider yourself a
feminist?”, “What would you
most like to be someday?”,
“Would you tend to see yourself
Figure 1. Avatar selection. Participants began the
task by selecting an avatar to represent them within
the game.

as more liberal or more
conservative?”, and “Do you
have a religious affiliation?”).

We based this designation on pre-screening data from an independent participant sample.
This sample rated the items according to how important each item was to them and how
important it would be for their friends to respond similarly. The remaining items were
rated as less important on both dimensions. Participants saw and responded to these
forced-choice multiple-choice questions in random order (see Figure 2).
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After participants responded to these
questions, they “exchanged” answers
with each of the other avatars. As
displayed in Figure 3, participants
viewed a screen containing the question,
their own avatar and response and
another avatar and that avatar’s response.
They viewed responses to each of the 20
questions for each avatar individually.
The computer fully randomized the
presentation order for the 80 items (20
Figure 2. Getting-acquainted question
example. Participants answered a series of
forced choice questions about themselves.
The computer used their answers to
manipulate objective similarity.

questions for each of four avatars).
The computer manipulated similarity
based on the participant’s responses to
the 20 questions. Two avatars were

“high” in similarity. These avatars mirrored more of the participant’s own responses to
the initial questions. Specifically, high-similarity avatars matched the participants’
responses on the four “important” questions (e.g., “What would you most like to be
someday?”). These avatars also matched on a random set of 12 of the less important
items (e.g., “What’s your favourite cuisine?”). The two avatars that were low in similarity
matched on fewer of the participant’s own responses to the 20 questions. These avatars
did not match on any of the attitude questions but did match on a random set of four of
the less important items. These numbers were selected based on pilot testing showing that
“low-similarity” avatars who matched participants’ responses on none of the items
detracted from the believability of the manipulation.
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A

B

Figure 3. Answer exchange examples. (a) This represents an instance of high
similarity. (b) This represents an instance of low similarity. Participants engaged
in 80 exchanges across the four avatars.

2.3

Social Reciprocity Manipulation

The social reciprocity manipulation occurred conjointly with the similarity
manipulation. Participants gave like/dislike feedback after viewing each avatar’s response
to the similarity items. After viewing the similarity information, participants gave
feedback to their partners using an emoji-style rating scale (Figure 4) similar to what one
might see in a social media application. After participants indicated their feedback
response (see Figure 4a), they saw a screen with their own emoji feedback and the
avatar’s feedback. The avatar’s responses could either be reciprocal (matching) (e.g.,
Figure 4b) or non-reciprocal (non-matching; Figure 4c). Importantly, non-reciprocal
feedback was 1-level more positive or 1-level more negative on the emoji scale than that
of the participant such that the average discrepancy in the feedback positivity between
avatars and participants was zero. Two avatars (one high in similarity and one low in
similarity were low-reciprocity, and provided matching emojis on only 20% of trials. The
remaining two avatars were high-reciprocity avatars and provided matching feedback on
80% of trials.
The task was programmed and presented in E-prime (v 2.0, Psychology Software).
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A

B

C

Figure 4. Social reciprocity feedback. (a) The feedback decision screen where the
participant decides what feedback to give the avatar. (b) An example of a reciprocal
feedback exchange. (c) An example a non-reciprocal feedback exchange.

2.4

Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI)

The TIPI (See Appendix D; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) was
administered at the end of the experimental manipulation of similarity and social
reciprocity. The TIPI assumes a 5-factor personality structure and measures extraversion
(“I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic), openness to experience (“I see myself as open
to new experiences, complex”), agreeableness (“I see myself as sympathetic, warm”),
emotional stability (“I see myself as calm, emotionally stable”), and conscientiousness (“I
see myself as dependable, self-disciplined”). Participants rated each avatar and
themselves using this instrument. We added one additional item to the avatar-ratings of
the TIPI in every experiment (“I see [avatar picture] as similar to me”). In Experiments 2
and 3 participants additionally rated each avatar on a second item (“I see [avatar picture]
as in sync with my feelings”). These additional items served to measure the degree to
which participants perceived the similarity and reciprocity manipulations. Participants
rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Disagree strongly; 7 = Agree strongly).
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Chapter 3

3

Experiment 1
3.1

Introduction

This experiment asks whether social reciprocity, in addition to similarity, influences
trust decisions. To answer this question, we utilized an economic game to measure trust.
Economic games have been used to measure trust behaviour for decades (e.g., Burnham,
McCabe, & Smith, 2000; Costa-Gomes, Huck, & Weizsacker, 2014; Glaeser, et al., 2000;
Ong, Zaki, & Gruber, 2017; Rotter, 1967). These games have also been demonstrated to
be a valid measurement of trust behaviour (Brulhart & Usunier, 2012).

3.1.1

Hypotheses

This experiment had two hypotheses: 1) there will be a significant main effect of
similarity on trust behaviour and 2) there will be a significant main effect of social
reciprocity on trust behaviour, such that greater levels of both similarity and reciprocity
will enhance trust.

3.2
3.2.1

Methods
Participants

Sixty-nine participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit and
a small monetary bonus, which was based on their performance in the trust game in this
study. Of these 69, 13 were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure (they did
not believe they had played real participants). The final sample therefore included fiftysix undergraduate participants (14 male, mean age = 18.45, SD = .83). All participants
gave documented informed consent and the University’s Ethics Committee approved all
study procedures (likewise for Experiments 2 & 3).

3.2.2

Procedures
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To measure trust, we used a simple economic game, based on a “centipede” game
(Rosenthal, 1981). In a traditional centipede game there are two players who take turns
passing pots of money or points (in the present case), until one of them chooses to defect
or some number of exchanges have happened (traditionally 100 exchanges). On any
given turn, the active player
receives two pots of money,
one large and one small. The
player then chooses to either
take the larger of the two
pots (giving the smaller to
Figure 5. Centipede-style game used in Experiment 1.

the other player) or to pass
both pots to the other player.

If a player chooses to pass the pots to the other player, the pots both double in size (see
Figure 5). We selected this game because, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma and other
common games (e.g., Kanazawa, & Fontaine, 2013; Sparks, Burleigh, & Barclay, 2016),
it is designed as an iterated game, and with each pass of the pots, the incentive to defect
increases.
The dominant strategy in this game is for the first player to take the pot on the first
round of the game (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992). However, humans rarely adhere to the
dominant strategy in simple economic games (Mailath, 1998). One potential reason why
players may make this choice is that they trust that their partners will not defect before
they do. Indeed, if one trusts one’s partner not to defect, one’s payout is likely to be
significantly larger with a cooperative strategy. Therefore, the number of rounds
participants choose to pass the pots is a proxy for trust behaviour.
A second advantage of using a centipede game over a commonly used Prisoner’s
Dilemma or similar game is that participants are less likely to be familiar with it. In a
typical undergraduate sample, there is a substantial risk that participants have
encountered the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a psychology class, experiment, or on
television. In order to increase the likelihood that participants were naïve to the trust
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measure, we opted for this less well known, yet still ecologically valid measurement of
trust.
Here we used a 10-round version of this game
(see Figure 6), in which participants played with
an avatar, that they believed to be a real partner.
The version used in Experiment 1 either ended
when the participant defected or when the game
had reached ten rounds. The avatars were
programmed to defect in round 10, if the
Figure 6. Participant decision
screen in centipede-style game.

participant had not already defected. Participants
knew that they would receive their game earnings

as a monetary bonus at the end of the experimental session. We manipulated similarity
and reciprocity using the method described in Chapter 2.

3.2.3

Data Analysis

To examine trustworthiness, we tallied the number of rounds participants chose to
pass the pots of points to each avatar. To test our hypotheses regarding the main effects
of similarity and social reciprocity on trust behaviours we conducted a 2 x 2 repeated
measures factorial ANOVA with avatar similarity (high, low) and avatar reciprocity
(high, low) as the independent variables and total passes as the dependent variable.

3.3

Results

To ensure that manipulated level objective similarity enhanced perceptions of
similarity, we conducted a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with similarity (low or high)
and social reciprocity (low or high) as within subjects factors and the degree to which
participants rated avatars as “similar to me” as the dependent variable revealed that
participants rate high similarity avatars as more similar to themselves than low similarity
avatars, F (1, 55) = 34.03, p < .001, ηρ2 = .382 (see Figure 7). There was no significant
relationship between avatar reciprocity and similarity ratings, F (1, 55) = 3.89, p = .054,
ηρ2 = .066, nor was there any interaction between the variables, F (1,55) = .054, p = .818,
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ηρ2 = .001. Though nonsignificant there does seem to be a trend for participants to rate
highly reciprocal avatars as more similar to themselves than low reciprocity avatars.
We also conducted a series of
Pearson Correlations between
self-rated personality and the
avatar personality ratings to
determine if highly similar avatars
are rated as more similar to the
self. Correlations between the low
similarity, low reciprocity avatar
and the self are predominantly
non-significant (with the
exception of extraversion), though
trending in the negative direction
(Extraversion: r = -.36, p = .007;

Figure 7. Manipulation check for similarity.
Participants rate the highly similar avatars as
more similar to themselves than the less similar
avatars. Error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals.

Agreeableness: r = -.02, p = .874;
Conscientiousness: r = -.15, p = .287; Emotional Stability: r = -.11, p = .419; Openness: r
= -.08, p = .557). Correlations between the low similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the
self follow the same trend as above (Extraversion: r = -.52, p < .001; Agreeableness: r =
.07, p = .625; Conscientiousness: r = -.14, p = .297; Emotional Stability: r = .00, p =
.983; Openness: r = -.04, p = .751). Correlations between the high similarity, low
reciprocity avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of
agreeableness), though trending in the positive directions (Extraversion: r = .00, p = .996;
Agreeableness: r = .28, p = .037; Conscientiousness: r = .20, p = .135; Emotional
Stability: r = .13, p =.349; Openness: r = .18, p = .194). Correlations between the high
similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self are non-significant, though predominantly
trending in the positive direction (Extraversion: r = .18, p = .193; Agreeableness: r = .13,
p = .352; Conscientiousness: r = -.04, p = .782; Emotional Stability: r = .22, p = .104;
Openness: r = .04, p = .786). These results, along with the results from the 2 x 2 ANOVA
above suggest that our similarity manipulation achieved its desired effect.
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A second 2 x 2 repeated
measures ANOVA with similarity
(low or high) and social
reciprocity (low or high) as within
subject factors and the total

A

rounds played with each avatar as
the dependent variable, revealed
both a main effect of similarity, F
(1, 55) = 7.42, p = .009, ηρ2 =
.119, and a main effect of social
reciprocity, F (1,55) = 11.75, p =
.001, ηρ2 = .176 (see Figure 8a).
In both cases, consistent with

B

hypotheses, higher levels of
similarity and reciprocity lead to
greater trust. The similarity by
social reciprocity interaction was
non-significant, F (1,55) = 1.59, p
= .213, ηρ2 = .028, suggesting that
these effects are independent.
Interestingly, a number of
participants (N = 3) opted to
defect on all avatars in Round 1
(i.e., they played the dominant

Figure 8. Main effects of similarity and social
reciprocity. Participants play more rounds with
avatars who are highly similar and highly
reciprocal in comparison to those who are low in
similarity and reciprocity. (a) Analysis on 56
participants, (b) analysis on 50 participants. Error
bars show the 95% confidence intervals

strategy). However, because the game with any given avatar ended when the participant
defected, an alternate explanation for these results might be that savvy research-poolrecruited participants were simply attempting to end their testing sessions early. To
examine this possibility, we repeated the analysis excluding any participant who defected
on the first trial with all four avatars. To balance this, we also excluded any participant
who stayed in the game for all 10 rounds with all four avatars, as these participants may
not have understood the task (N = 3). This analysis therefore included 50 participants. As
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above, we found a significant main effect of similarity, F (1, 49) = 7.52, p = .008, ηρ2 =
.133, and a significant main effect of social reciprocity, F (1, 49) = 12.03, p = .001, ηρ2 =
.197. The similarity by social reciprocity interaction was non-significant, F (1, 49) =
1.59, p = .213, ηρ2 = .031. Thus, these results suggest that similarity and social reciprocity
indeed contribute to trust decisions independently of one another (see Figure 8b).

3.4

Discussion

Taken together, these results support both of our hypotheses. We found significant
main effects of both similarity and social reciprocity on trust behaviour. Specifically,
people are more trusting of those who express similar preferences and whose behaviour
demonstrates greater levels of social reciprocity than they are of people who are less
similar and behave less reciprocally. The lack of an interaction effects suggest that
similarity and social reciprocity operate independently in terms of their contributions to
trust decisions.
These data therefore suggest that in addition similarity, which is a well-established
predictor of trust, social reciprocity independently contributes to these decisions.
However, one limitation of this study was that some participants may have quickly
realized that defection was a way to shorten the study session. This means that after an
initial defection, participants might have opted to defect in order to avoid completing
more trust trials. In order to ensure that such experiment-levels variables did not explain
the results, we conducted a second set of experiments, using a different measure of trust.
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Chapter 4

4

Experiment 2
4.1

Introduction

This experiment replicates findings from Experiment 1 using a different economic
game. The aim of Experiment 2 is therefore twofold. First, we sought to resolve
limitations in Experiment 1 by choosing an “investor-trustee” game (Berg, Dickhaut, &
McCabe, 1995) in which participants must complete all rounds but may vary their
economic strategies depending on their opponent. Second, we aimed to determine
whether the effect of social reciprocity as a predictor of trust behaviour is robust by
examining whether it replicates in another task context.
The investor-trustee game is an economic game that is often used in psychological
research (e.g., King-Casas, et al., 2005; Kosfeld, Heinirchs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr,
2005; Shore & Heerey, 2013). In the typical version of this game, the “investor” receives
an endowment and must then choose how much of the endowment to invest with a
“trustee.” If money is invested, the trustee receives a “matured” investment. In typical
games, the matured amount is typically triple the original investment (Berg, Dickhaut, &
McCabe, 1995). The trustee then chooses how much of the investment to return to the
investor. Thus, the amount invested indicates the degree to which the investor trusts the
trustee and the return indicates the trustee’s actual trustworthiness. In addition to the
initial replication experiment (here labeled Experiment 2a) we also completed a direct
replication of this task (Experiment 2b) to ensure the reliability of our results.

4.1.1

Hypotheses
As above, we predicted significant and independent main effects of both

similarity and social reciprocity on trust behaviour, such that greater levels of both
similarity and reciprocity will enhance trust, as measured by investments in an iterated
version of the investor-trustee game. The hypotheses for Experiment 2b were preregistered on the Open Science Framework (OSF; Heerey & Clerke, 2017
(osf.io/dv7np)).
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4.2
4.2.1

Experiment 2a and b
Methods

4.2.1.1
4.2.1.1.1

Participants
Experiment 2a

Seventy-four participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit
and a small monetary bonus, which was based on their performance in the investortrustee game. Of these 74, 9 were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure
(they did not believe they had played real participants). The final sample therefore
included sixty-five undergraduate participants (17 male, mean age = 18.63, SD = .86).

4.2.1.1.2

Experiment 2b

Eighty-five participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit and
a small monetary bonus, which was based on their performance in the investor-trustee
game. Of these 85, 13 were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure. The
final sample therefore included seventy-two participants (19 male, mean age = 18.70, SD
= 1.14).

4.2.1.2

Procedures

Here we used a 10-round version of this game
in which each participant played 5 rounds as the
investor and 5 rounds as the trustee with each
avatar (see Figure 9). Asking participants to play
both game roles allowed us to both maintain the
deception that they played real partners and
allowed us to examine differences in both trusting

Figure 9. Example of a turn of
the investor-trustee game.

behaviour and trustworthiness for each
participant. As in Experiment 1, participants believed that the avatar was a real partner.
They played all game rounds in random order and without feedback, meaning that they
did not know what portion of their investment had been returned to them when they
played the investor role. We did this to ensure that the presence of feedback did not shape
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subsequent trials. In the investor role, participants received a 10-point endowment and
chose what proportion to invest with their partner on the round. We allowed participants
to choose from the full range of the endowment (0% to 100%).
When the participant played the trustee role, they chose what proportion of the
matured investment to return to their partner, ranging from 0% to 100%. To ensure that
participants’ behaviour was not affected by differential investment amounts across the
avatars, we controlled this variable. Over the course of the five trustee-role trials with
each avatar, participants received investments of 3 points, 4 points, 5 points, 6 points and
7 points. These trial orders were fully randomized to minimize the chance of participants
guessing the nature of our manipulation. Debriefing data confirmed that no participant
guessed this manipulation. Finally, participants knew that they would receive their game
earnings as a monetary bonus at the end of the experimental session.
Prior to the investor trustee game, we manipulated similarity and reciprocity using
the method described in Chapter 2.

4.2.1.3

Data Analysis

To examine participants’ beliefs about avatar trustworthiness, we calculated the
average number of points that a participant invested with each avatar. We also calculated
the proportion of the original investment that a participant returned to each avatar when
in the trustee role. These data served as the dependent variables in our analyses

4.2.2

Results

4.2.2.1

Experiment (2a)

To test whether our similarity and social reciprocity manipulation effectively
altered perceptions of similarity and feelings of being “in sync,” we conducted two 2 x 2
repeated measures ANOVAs with similarity (low or high) and social reciprocity (low or
high) as within subjects factors and the degree to which participants rated avatars as
“similar to me” and “in sync with me” as the dependent variables, respectively. Results
from the first ANOVA revealed that participants rated high similarity avatars as more
similar to themselves than low similarity avatars, F (1, 58) = 13.90, p < .001, ηρ2 = .193,
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and that they rated high reciprocity
avatars as more similar to
themselves than low reciprocity
avatars, F (1, 58) = 16.73, p <
.001, ηρ2 = .224 (see Figure 10).
There was no significant
interaction between the two
variables, F (1, 58) = .67, p = .416,
ηρ2 = .011. These results suggest
that although our manipulation of
similarity achieved its desired
effect, it was jointly influenced by
the reciprocity manipulation.
Results from the second ANOVA
revealed that participants rated

Figure 10. Manipulation check for similarity and
social reciprocity. Participants rate the highly
similar and reciprocal avatars as more similar to
and in sync with themselves than the less similar
and reciprocal avatars. Error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.
.

highly reciprocal avatars as more in sync with themselves than low reciprocity avatars, F
(1, 58) = 31.81, p < .001, ηρ2 = .354, and that participants rate highly similar avatars as
more in sync with themselves than low similarity avatars, F (1, 58) = 15.38, p < .001, ηρ2
= .210. There was also a significant interaction between the two variables, F = (1, 58) =
4.64, p = .035, ηρ2 = .074, which suggests that the highly similar and highly reciprocal
avatar is rated as most in sync and the low similar, low reciprocity avatar as least in sync
with the participants (see Figure 10). These results suggest that although our reciprocity
manipulation achieved its desired effect, it was influenced by our similarity manipulation.
Ratings on the similarity and social reciprocity manipulation checks are significantly
correlated with one another, r = .79, p < .001.
We also conducted a series of Pearson Correlations between self-rated personality
and the avatar personality ratings to determine if highly similar avatars are rated as more
similar to the self. Correlations between the low similarity, low reciprocity avatar and the
self were non-significant (with the exception of openness; Extraversion: r = -.02, p =
.896; Agreeableness: r = .16, p = .200; Conscientiousness: r = .02, p = .854; Emotional
Stability: r = .14, p = .263; Openness: r = .26, p = .037). Correlations between the low

27

similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self are largely non-significant, with the
exception of agreeableness (Extraversion: r = -.10, p = .420; Agreeableness: r = .26, p =
.040; Conscientiousness: r = .00, p = .943; Emotional Stability: r = .03, p = .817;
Openness: r = .05, p = .705). Correlations between the high similarity, low reciprocity
avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of
agreeableness), though mostly trending in the positive direction (Extraversion: r = -.06, p
= .610; Agreeableness: r = .25, p = .049; Conscientiousness: r = .06, p = .638; Emotional
Stability: r = .15, p =.231; Openness: r = .08, p = .547). Correlations between the high
similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the
exception of agreeableness and openness), though mostly trending in the positive
direction (Extraversion: r = -.02, p = .882; Agreeableness: r = .39, p = .001;
Conscientiousness: r = .226, p = .070; Emotional Stability: r = .05, p = .712; Openness: r
= .318, p = .010). These results suggest that participants were more likely to rate high
similarity avatar the same way they rated themselves, though not significantly.
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Another 2 x 2 repeated

A

measures ANOVA with
similarity (low or high) and
social reciprocity (low or high)
as within subjects factors and the
average points invested with
each avatar as the dependent
variable, revealed both a main
effect of similarity, F (1, 64) =
6.59, p = .013, ηρ2 = .093, and a
main effect of social reciprocity,

B

F (1, 64) = 6.28, p = .015, ηρ2 =
.089 (see Figure 11a). In both
cases, consistent with
hypotheses, higher levels of
similarity and reciprocity lead to
greater trust. The similarity by
social reciprocity interaction was
non-significant, F (1, 64) = .33, p
= .570, ηρ2 = .005, suggesting
that these effects are
independent.
An exploratory 2 x 2
repeated measures ANOVA with
similarity (low or high) and

Figure 11. Effects of similarity and social
reciprocity. (a) Participants invest more with
highly similar and highly reciprocal avatars then
with avatars who are low in similarity and social
reciprocity. (b) Participants returned a greater
proportion of the initial investment to highly
reciprocal avatars. This effect is amplified when
similarity is also high. Error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.

social reciprocity (low or high)
as within subjects factors and the average proportion of points returned to each avatar as
a dependent variable revealed a main effect of social reciprocity, F (1, 64) = 4.82, p =
.032, ηρ2 = .070, and a significant interaction between similarity and social reciprocity, F
(1, 64) = 4.51, p = .038, ηρ2 = .066. There was no significant main effect of similarity, F
(1, 64) = .031, p = .861, ηρ2 = .000 (see Figure 11b).
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4.2.2.2

Experiment 2b

We tested the effectiveness of
our similarity and social reciprocity
manipulations in the same way it was
described in Experiment 2a. The 2 x 2
repeated measures ANOVA that had
the degree to which participants rated
the avatars as “similar to me” as the
dependent variable revealed that
participants rate highly similar
avatars as more similar to themselves
than low similarity avatars, F (1, 71)
= 60.16, p < .001, ηρ2 = .459, and that
participants rate highly reciprocal
avatars as more similar to themselves
than low reciprocity avatars, F (1, 71)
= 4.35, p = .041, ηρ2 = .058. There

Figure 12. Manipulation check for similarity
and social reciprocity. Participants rate highly
similar and highly reciprocal avatar as more
similar to themselves than avatars who are low
in similarity and reciprocity. Participants rate
highly similar avatars as more in sync with
themselves but not highly reciprocal avatars in
comparison to avatars that are low on these
variables. Error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals.

was no significant interaction
between the two variables, F (1, 71) = .26, p = .609, ηρ2 = .004. This suggests that, as
above, although our similarity manipulation had the desired effect but it was influenced
by our social reciprocity manipulation as well. The 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA that
had the degree to which participants rated the avatars as “in sync with me” as the
dependent variable revealed that participants did not rate highly reciprocal avatars as
more in sync with themselves than low reciprocity avatars, F (1, 71) = 2.64, p =.109, ηρ2
= .036, and that participants do rate highly similar avatars as more in sync with them than
low similarity avatars, F (1, 71) = 31.00, p < .001, ηρ2 = .304. There was no significant
interaction between the two variables, F (1,71) = .75, p = .390, ηρ2 = .010. These results
suggest that participants may not have attended to our social reciprocity manipulation to
the same degree as in other experiments. Ratings on the similarity and social reciprocity
manipulation checks are significantly correlated with one another, r = .79, p < .001.

30

Like above, we conducted a series of Pearson Correlations between self-rated
personality and the avatar personality ratings to determine if highly similar avatars are
rated as more similar to the self. Correlations between the low similarity, low reciprocity
avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of extraversion),
though trending in the negative directions (Extraversion: r = -.25, p = .031;
Agreeableness: r = -.07, p = .583; Conscientiousness: r = -.05, p = .698; Emotional
Stability: r = -.07, p = .536; Openness: r = -.16, p = .168). Correlations between the low
similarity, high reciprocity avatar (Extraversion: r = -.05, p =.691; Agreeableness: r = .09, p = .467; Conscientiousness: r = -.05, p = .672; Emotional Stability: r = .04, p = .742;
Openness: r = -.15, p = .202) and the high similarity, low reciprocity avatar
(Extraversion: r = -.19, p = .166; Agreeableness: r = .20, p = .086; Conscientiousness: r =
.15, p = .208; Emotional Stability: r = .20, p =.085; Openness: r = .10, p = .422) are nonsignificant. Correlations between the high similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the self
are predominantly non-significant (with the exception of extraversion and openness)
though trending in the positive direction (Extraversion: r = .25, p = .037; Agreeableness: r
= .21, p = .079; Conscientiousness: r = .17, p = .151; Emotional Stability: r = .15, p =
.217; Openness: r = .36, p = .002). These results suggest that participants are rating the
high similarity and high reciprocity avatar as more similar to the self.
Another 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with similarity (low or high) and social
reciprocity (low or high) as within subjects factors and the average points invested with
each avatar as the dependent variable revealed both a main effect of similarity, F (1,71) =
13.46, p < .001, ηρ2 = .159, and of social reciprocity, F (1, 71) = 8.10, p = .006, ηρ2 =
.102. There was no significant interaction between the two variables, F (1, 71) = .10, p =
.749, ηρ2 = .001. These data are consistent with the Experiment 2a results.
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A final exploratory 2 x 2
repeated measures ANOVA with

A

similarity (low or high) and social
reciprocity (low or high) as within
subjects factors and the average
proportion of points returned to
each avatar as the dependent
variable revealed no significant
main effects of similarity, F (1,71)
= 3.70, p = .058, ηρ2 = .050, or
social reciprocity, F (1,71) = .04, p
= .848,

ηρ2

B

= .001. There was no

significant interaction between the
two variables, F (1,71) = .65, p =
.425, ηρ2 = .009.

4.2.3

Discussion

Taken together, these results
support both of our main
hypotheses. We found significant
main effects of both similarity and
social reciprocity on trust
behaviour, as in Experiment 1.
Specifically, people trust those who
are higher similarity and reciprocity
than people who are lower in

Figure 13. Effects of similarity and social
reciprocity. (a) Participants invest more with
avatars who are highly similar and high in
reciprocity in comparison to avatars who are
low in similarity and social reciprocity. (b)
Participant’s own trustworthiness is not effect
by the similarity or reciprocity levels of the
avatars. Error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals.

similarity and reciprocity. However,
when we examined the degree to which our participants behaved in a trustworthy manner
themselves, we saw only reciprocity emerge as a factor, along with a similarity by
reciprocity interaction in Experiment 2a. In Experiment 2b, the trustworthiness of
participants’ own behaviour was not affected by avatar similarity or reciprocity levels.
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Chapter 5

5

Experiment 3
5.1

Introduction

This experiment aimed to replicate the findings of Experiments 1 & 2 using social
rather than financial decisions. Thus, the purpose of this experiment was to test the
robustness of similarity and social reciprocity as predictors of trust behaviour in social
scenarios. In addition, this experiment sought to further disentangle the contributions of
similarity and reciprocity to trust decisions. Recall that in our manipulation (see Chapter
2), similarity and reciprocity are fully crossed (i.e., each avatar’s behaviour is either high
or low on similarity and likewise on reciprocity. The high similarity/high reciprocity
avatar appeared to be the most trustworthy across the data sets. Thus, participants’
decisions may reflect the additive value of similarity and reciprocity together. This makes
it somewhat difficult to determine how these variables independently contribute to choice
behaviour.
Here, we use an idea from expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morganstern,
1947) to disentangle these effects. Specifically, we ask how participants apportion their
choices across pairs of avatars, depending on how those avatars differ in similarity and
reciprocity. This method essentially uses a “transitivity” task to examine the strength of
participants’ preferences across the decision space. This means that we ask participants to
make a decision using information they have already learned about each avatar. Based on
participants’ decisions, we then model the degree to which avatar similarity and
reciprocity determine the architecture of choice behaviour, or avatar utility, across a set
of social trust decisions. This type of design is a common method for examining
preferences within a decision space (e.g., Chung, Christopoulos, King-Casas, Ball, &
Chiu, 2015; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Kandasamy et al., 2014)

5.1.1

Hypotheses
As in the first two experiments, we predicted significant effects of both similarity

and social reciprocity on trust decisions, such that greater levels of both similarity and
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social reciprocity will enhance trust, as measured by decisions in a utility task. This
experiment also has a third hypothesis that social reciprocity will contribute more to
social decisions than similarity, such that social reciprocity will be a more important
predictor of choices than similarity. We expect this because in real-world interactions,
social reciprocity may be the first interpersonal characteristic that people notice after
appearance similarity, so it is likely that it shapes our perceptions of people on a whole
more so than similarity. These hypotheses were pre-registered prior to data-collection on
the OSF (Heerey & Clerke, 2017 (osf.io/dv7np)).

5.2 Methods
5.2.1

Participants

Ninety-seven participants completed this study in exchange for partial course credit. Of
these ninety-seven, nine were discarded from the analysis due to deception failure and
five additional participants were discarded due to poor performance on the decision task.
Poor performance on the decision task was defined as having made a choice in less than
350ms on 25% or more of the test trials. This data exclusion decision was made based on
N400 research which suggests that at least 350-400ms is necessary for people to read and
understand short phrases, like those in our decision task (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; Kutas
& Federmeier, 2011). Thus responses that are shorter than 350ms are likely to be
anticipatory responding that is not representative of deliberate decision making. The final
sample therefore included eighty-five undergraduate participants (23 male, mean age =
18.68, SD = 1.29).

5.2.2

Procedures
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As in Experiments 1 and 2, the task began
with our standard manipulation of similarity and

A

reciprocity. In this Experiment, we measured trust
using a social decision making task in which
participants chose one of two avatars to engage
with in a hypothetical trust scenario in each trial
(e.g., who would you rather lend your car keys to,
who would you ask to be your designated driver;

B

see Figure 14a and Appendix E). The trust items
were pre-rated by an independent set of participants
based on 1) the extent to which each scenario
affects the average university undergraduate student
and 2) the extent to which the item is a good
indicator of whether or not one trusts someone.
Participants viewed each of the six possible
avatar pairings (see Figure 14b) for each of 14 trust
items, meaning that there were 84 test trials. The
placement of the avatars within each choice pair
was counterbalanced so that each avatar appeared
on the left and on the right side of the pairing on an
equal number of trials. How participants apportion
their choices across this decision space tells us how
they are using the relative difference between
avatar similarity and reciprocity to guide their

Figure 14. Utility task. (a)
Utility task decision screen. (b)
Six possible avatar pairings.

choices.

5.2.3

Data Analysis

To examine the degree to which avatar similarity and reciprocity shaped choice
behaviour, we individually modeled each participant’s choices using a logistic model to
fit the data. The model predicted the likelihood that a participant would select the avatar
on the left, given the characteristics of avatar on the right. The model included terms for
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avatar similarity and reciprocity, coded as the difference between the left avatar and the
right one for each variable. We used a standard logistic model to fit the choice data.

The parameter θ in the logistic equation was estimated as:

In this equation, the βs are the estimated, unstandardized regression weights. β0
refers to the intercept; β1 is the degree to which similarity influenced choice behaviour; β2
is the estimated regression weight for social reciprocity; and β3 is the similarity x social
reciprocity interaction. The Xs in the equation represent the difference between the avatar
on the left and the avatar on the right for similarity (X1), social reciprocity (X2), and the
similarity by social reciprocity interaction (X3). The model used an iteratively reweighted least squared algorithm to obtain the maximum likelihood estimate for each of
the terms (O’Leary, D.P., 1990). The more these values differ from zero, the greater the
influence of each term on participants’ decisions.
Participants’ unstandardized regression weights for similarity, social reciprocity,
and the similarity x social reciprocity interaction were subsequently examined using onesample t-tests against a test value of zero. This allowed us to test whether participants
used these values to guide choice behaviour in the task. To examine their relative
weightings, we conducted a paired samples t-test.

5.3

Results

To test whether our manipulations of similarity and social reciprocity had their
desired effect, we conducted two 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs with similarity (low
or high) and social reciprocity (low or high) as within subjects factors and the degree to
which participants rated avatars as “similar to me” and “in sync with me” as the
respective dependent variables. Results revealed that participants rated highly similar
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avatars as more similar to
themselves, F (1, 84) = 32.86, p <
.001, ηρ2 = .281, and that
participants rated highly
reciprocal avatars as more similar
to themselves, F (1, 84) = 25.94,
p < .001, ηρ2 = .236 (see Figure
15). Results from the second
analysis revealed that participants
rated highly reciprocal avatars as
more in sync with themselves, F
(1, 84) = 16.83, p < .001,

ηρ2

=

.167, and that participants rated
highly similar avatars as more in

Figure 15. Manipulation check for similarity and
social reciprocity. Participants rate highly similar
and highly reciprocal avatars as more similar to
and in sync with themselves than low similarity
and low reciprocity avatars. Error bars show the
95% confidence intervals.

sync with themselves, F (1, 84) =
20.61, p < .001, ηρ2 = .197. There was no significant interaction between the two
variables, F (1, 84) = 1.70, p = .196, ηρ2 = .020 (see Figure 15). Ratings on the similarity
and social reciprocity manipulation checks are significantly correlated with one another, r
= .76, p < .001.
As in the previous experiments, we conducted a series of Pearson Correlations
between self-rated personality and the avatar personality ratings to determine if highly
similar avatars are rated as more similar to the self. Correlations between the low
similarity, low reciprocity avatar and the self are predominantly non-significant (with the
exception of extraversion and openness to experience) but are trending in the negative
direction (Extraversion: r = -.31, p = .004; Agreeableness: r = -.12, p = .264;
Conscientiousness: r = .15, p = .176; Emotional Stability: r = .10, p = .374; Openness: r =
-.24, p = .029). Correlations between the low similarity, high reciprocity avatar and the
self are non-significant (Extraversion: r = -.11, p =.319; Agreeableness: r = .182, p =
.095; Conscientiousness: r = .07, p = .516; Emotional Stability: r = .06, p = .613;
Openness: r = .12, p = 265). Correlations between the high similarity, low reciprocity
avatar are largely non-significant, with the exception of conscientiousness (Extraversion:
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r = .03, p = .785; Agreeableness: r
= .14, p = .190; Conscientiousness:
r = .23, p = .035; Emotional
Stability: r = -.05, p =.660;
Openness: r = .09, p = .416).
Correlations between the high
similarity, high reciprocity avatar
and the self are also predominantly
non-significant (with the exception
of openness) though trending in
the positive direction
(Extraversion: r = .11, p = .307;
Agreeableness: r = .05, p = .630;

Figure 16. Effects of similarity and social
reciprocity. Similarity and social reciprocity
contribute equally to trust decisions. Error bars
show the 95% confidence intervals.

Conscientiousness: r = .20, p =
.063; Emotional Stability: r = -.15,
p = .170; Openness: r = .24, p =
.031).
To test whether similarity and
social reciprocity had a significant
effect on trust decisions, we
conducted a set of one-sample ttest with the means of the
unstandardized regression weights
(β-values) as the test variables.
Results revealed that both
similarity, t (84) = 6.10, p < .001,

Figure 17. Probability of choice behaviour given
avatar characteristics. Error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.

and social reciprocity, t (84) = 4.46, p < .001, were significantly different from zero
indicating that both influenced trust decisions. The interaction between the two variables
was non-significant, t (84) = -1.72, p = .090 (see Figures 16 and 17). A paired-samples ttest with the beta-values of similarity and social reciprocity as the test variables revealed
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that the two variables are not significantly different from one another, t (84) = .72, p =
.47. This means that similarity and social reciprocity contribute equally to trust decisions.

5.4

Discussion

These results support two of our three hypotheses. We found that, as in Experiments 1
and 2, similarity and social reciprocity both significantly affected trust decisions.
Specifically, people trust those who are more similar and behave more reciprocally than
people who are lower in similarity and reciprocity. However, when we examined the
difference between similarity and social reciprocity in terms of their independent
contributions to trust decisions, we found no significant difference. Thus, both similarity
and social reciprocity contributed to trust decisions in a similar fashion. Contrary to our
prediction however, reciprocity was not weighted more heavily than similarity, even
though it may be apparent in real-world decisions before interaction partners know
enough information about each other to make similarity judgments.
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Chapter 6
A

6

MetaAnalyses
Meta-analyses

combine data from
several experiments
and/or studies to better
estimate the true effect of
an independent variable
within a population.
Here, we conducted two
meta-analyses of the
results from Experiments
1, 2, and 3 to determine
the overall effect size of

B

similarity and social
reciprocity. The metaanalysis was conducted
with the statistical
software package R (R
Core Team, 2017;
Viechtbauer, 2010) using
Pearson’s r coefficients
as measures of effect
size. We chose to use
Pearson’s r coefficient
because it is one of the
easier effect size metrics
to interpret given that it

Figure 18. Meta-analyses. (a) Meta-analysis of the
similarity effect across experiments. (b) Meta-analysis of
the reciprocity effect across experiments.
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ranges from 0 to ±1.The first meta-analysis (see Figure 17a) revealed that the overall
effect for the main effect of similarity across studies was r = .42 (CI: 0.30 to .54). The
second meta-analysis (see Figure 17b) revealed that the overall effect for the main effect
of social reciprocity across studies was r = .38 (CI: .28 to .48). Thus, results show that
there is a consistent effect for both similarity and reciprocity as predictors of trust
development.
These findings support our hypotheses across the set of experiments as a whole.
They also indicate that the effect sizes for both similarity and reciprocity are comparable
in strength. Together, these results indicate that models of trust development must
account for social reciprocity, in addition to similarity across participants.
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Chapter 7

7

General Discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 reliably demonstrate that similarity and social reciprocity are

important contributors to financial trust decisions. Moreover, they demonstrate that these
two variables operate independently (i.e. there is no significant interaction). Experiment
2a also showed that people behave in a more trustworthy fashion themselves when their
interaction partners are high in social reciprocity. Interestingly, this effect did not
generalize to similarity. In Experiment 2b, there was no effect of similarity or social
reciprocity on participant’s own trustworthiness, although this may have been related to
the weak manipulation check results. Experiment 3 additionally shows that after
controlling for one another, similarity and social reciprocity both contribute equally and
significantly to decisions to trust in social contexts.
The notion that similarity and social reciprocity both contribute equally to
decisions to trust is important, given that previous work has almost entirely
conceptualized similarity, in appearance, group membership or attitudes, as the largest
contributor to these decisions (e.g., DeBruine, 2002; Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006;
MacDonald, Schug, Chase, & Barth, 2013; Williams, 2001; Ziegler & Golbeck, 2007).
One reason why the literature has conceptualized similarity as singularly important is that
similarity is easier to manipulate and measure in both experimental and observational
contexts than social reciprocity (Diehl 1990; Heerey, 2015). However, in real-world
interactions, social reciprocity may be apparent before anything other than physical
similarity. That is, interaction partners must interact in some fashion in order to learn that
they have similar interests, attitudes, beliefs, etc. This interaction necessarily involves the
exchange of contingent social cues (Cialdini & Golstein, 2004; Heerey & Crossley,
2013). Thus, social reciprocity has temporal precedence over similarity in the real world.
It is probable that high levels of social reciprocity during interaction shapes how
people interpret the level of similarity between themselves and an interaction partner. For
example, manipulation check findings from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that high levels
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of social reciprocity influence perceived levels of similarity, such that people perceive
highly reciprocal avatars as more similar to themselves than avatars that engage in less
social reciprocity. This suggests that social reciprocity, which makes interactions feel
smoother and more fluent (Delaherche et al., 2012), may have heuristic value as an
indicator of similarity. When interactions feel more fluent, interaction partners perceive
more similarity, which then leads to higher levels of trust. Thus, reciprocity may be a
nonverbal indicator of similarity, which people interpret as trustworthiness.
From a theoretical perspective, this idea makes sense as reciprocity can be defined
as the contingent exchange of social cues, which implies a similarity of interaction style.
Without expected levels of reciprocity, people’s interaction styles may lead to greater
disfluency and awkwardness. Both interpersonal similarity and social reciprocity have
been linked to smoothness and comfort of an interaction, which indicates that both may
be necessary for a successful interaction (Byrne, 1971; Delaherche, et al., 2012). This
may be because the two variables are tightly linked with one another, meaning that they
may be perceived as a joint aspect of person perception.
Social reciprocity may also change the way people actively acquire social
information. For example, if reciprocity is high, people may feel that their initial
interactions are smoother and more coordinated and experience this as positive or
rewarding (Delaherche et al., 2012). They may subsequently seek out points of similarity
between themselves and their interaction partners, as similarities in interests and attitudes
may form the foundation of friendships by providing a source of common ground
(Youyou, et al., 2017). This could mean that people perceive others as more similar to
themselves even when objectively similarity levels are lower. This is consistent with the
notion that similarity need not be objective to enhance trust (Sanders et al., 2015;
Whitmore & Dunsmore, 2014). Thus, social reciprocity may underpin similarity
perception and consequently shape trust decisions.
Even though reciprocity may shape perceptions of similarity, our data suggest that
perceived similarity reliably influences decisions to trust, meaning that it is still an
important factor in longer-term relationships in which people get to know one another
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more deeply. However, in minimal interactions between strangers, it is plausible that
social reciprocity acts as a guiding heuristic for trust-based decisions because reciprocity
may be more immediately available in real social encounters. However, when people
have the opportunity to get to know one another, perceived similarity is likely influenced
by variables other than reciprocity, which demonstrates the independent contribution of
perceptions of similarity.
Both similarity and social reciprocity may be influencing trust-based decisions via
a fluency effect. Specifically, information about similarity and reciprocity, which is more
readily available than information about actual trustworthiness, become a proxy measure
of interpersonal trustworthiness. This may be especially true in the short-interactions
between strangers that are commonplace in the experimental setting in which this work is
based. For instance, in a five-minute interaction there are many instances where social
reciprocity and similarities may become apparent but this is less likely for
trustworthiness. Further, given that similarity and social reciprocity are commonplace in
interactions (Oullier, de Guzman, Jantzen, Lagarde, & Kelso, 2008; Wheeler & Miyake,
1992), people are likely to be good at detecting and interpreting these cues. Thus, people
likely interpret similarity and reciprocity as cues, in comparison to trustworthiness, due to
the ease and fluency associated with their processing.

7.1

Implications

Trust is the cornerstone of all interpersonal relationships, which means that
understanding the basis for trust formation provides insight to the basis of relationship
formation. Thus, from this set of experiments, we have learned that both high levels of
similarity and social reciprocity are crucial to the development of successful
relationships. While the idea of similarity being important in relationships has been
around for a while, the results have been inconsistent (Luo & Zhang, 2009; Youyou et al.,
2017). Reciprocity of liking has been stated to influence relationships but little work has
been done to suggest that reciprocity of social cues plays an important role as well. This
may be because the concept of fluidity of social interactions is rarely considered outside
of clinical lore and a small body of literature describing social interaction from an
ethnographic perspective. However, in normal functioning this reciprocity also matters.
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Because it is so frequent (Oullier et al., 2008), people may come to expect its presence
(Heerey, 2015; Heerey & Crossley, 2013). When reciprocity is disrupted or does not
occur at expected rates, it may be perceived as offputting and indicate to the receiver that
this interaction partner should be passed over in favour of more fruitful partners. To the
extent that they are non-overlapping constructs, similarity may serve similar purposes.
Nonetheless, this set of experiments provides high powered evidence to suggest that
similarity and social reciprocity do indeed shape social outcomes.
This work also speaks to the need to reconsider similarity as the main (or possibly
only) predictor of trust behaviour, especially in the context of trust development in
stranger interactions or in new relationships. Given that social reciprocity often has
temporal precedence over similarity it is likely that reciprocity of social cues impacts
impressions of trustworthiness before similaritiy and that these cues shape interpretations
of similarity. This may mean that reciprocity is really the driving factor behind both of
these effects.

7.2

Limitations

One obvious limitation of this set of experiments is that it describes “interactions”
that were completely computer controlled. However, this is the only way to tightly
control and manipulate social cues and information without the use of confederates, who
are prone to their own sources of error including memory limitations and fluctuations in
behaviour across experimental sessions and task conditions (e.g., Kuhlen & Brennan,
2013). Nonetheless, even though these avatar interactions were not as realistic as true
interactions, all the participants we included in our analyses genuinely believed they had
interacted with other people. The fact that we observed such consistent results even in the
minimal social context of the present research, suggests that these interactions are an
excellent proxy for real face-to-face behaviour, which we simply do not have the ability
to manipulate cleanly. Moreover, true manipulation of objective similarity and social
reciprocity is the only way to determine the degree to which such variables are causally
important in determining trust judgments. Here, we can confidently say that higher levels
of objective similarity and social reciprocity caused increases in trust behaviour and that
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these results demonstrate the importance of incorporating both variables in explorations
of the underpinnings of trust-based decision-making.
The second limitation of this set of experiments is that we used convenience samples
of participants from Western’s undergraduate research pool. Although these students may
not be representative of the general population in many respects (Peterson, 2001), in the
context of online social behaviour, they are probably quite a good test sample as they are
generally frequent social media users and therefore conduct a large proportion of their
social lives online (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr (2010). Given that this project is
proof of concept work, a convenience sample of this type is justifiable.
The final limitation of this work is that although the manipulation we used allows us
to conclude that similarity and reciprocity are important and independent predictors of
trust, it does not allow us to determine the relationship between them. We have argued
that reciprocity may precede perceptions of similarity and trust or that it may act to
enhance interaction “fluency,” such that people perceive similarity even when it is
lacking in an objective sense. Our data do not, however, allow us to speak to the natural
relationships between these variables, which will be important to disentangle in both
experimental and observational contexts.

7.3

Future Directions

Given that our work has not been able to disentangle the effects of similarity and
social reciprocity, an important future direction is to determine the relationship between
perceptions of similarity and the presence of social reciprocity. The fact that our data
showed that both reciprocity and objective similarity predicted perceived similarity,
suggests that the relationship between these variables may be more complicated than
previous research, our own included, has been able to examine. We have argued that
reciprocity may precede perceptions of similarity by changing people’s experience of an
interaction. However, to truly understand these effects, we must design an experimental
manipulation that tests the foundations of these relationships.
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Another important direction now that we have determined that social reciprocity
independently contributes to trust decisions in an experimental context will be to
determine whether these results are replicable in a naturalistic interaction. Specifically, it
will be important to determine whether greater instances of unmanipulated social
reciprocity in face-to-face interaction produce increases in trust behaviour. Indeed, there
are a number of interesting negotiation games (e.g., van den Assem, van Dolder, & thaler,
2010) that will allow us to examine the relationship between reciprocity and trust in faceto-face contexts. If these effects exist in real-world interactions, then we can be sure that
reciprocity really does play a crucial role in trust decisions. Otherwise, these effects lack
ecological validity, which may be a critical weakness of the similarity and trust research.

7.4

Conclusion

Trust is an important aspect of all interpersonal relationships. These data demonstrate
that people trust others more when they are highly objectively similar and engage in high
levels of social reciprocity. Thus, both social reciprocity and similarity are likely to be
important precursors to the feelings of trust that underpin relationship development.
Given that successful interpersonal relationships are key to social life and well-being
(Siedlecki, Salthouse, Oishi, & Jeswani, 2013; Valkenburg, Peter, & Schouten, 2006,
understanding what leads to successful versus unsuccessful relationships is crucial. Here,
we have reliably demonstrated that similarity and social reciprocity are two such
variables that lead to trust and thereby contribute to interpersonal relationship
development.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Letters of Information
Experiment 1 & 2:
Project Title: Social cues in a chat-room environment
Document Title: Letter of information
Principal Investigator: Dr. Erin Heerey, PhD (eheerey@uwo.ca)
Invitation to Participate: You are being invited to participate in a research study investigating
how social cues in an online environment shape people’s later behaviour. You are being invited to
participate because you signed up for the study on SONA.
Why is this study being done? The purpose of this study is to understand how nonverbal social
cues affect the outcomes of social interactions.
How long will you be in this study? Participation takes about 1 hour and the session will take
place in the social psychology research rooms (6400 Block SSC).
What are the study procedures? If you decide to participate, we will ask you to:
 Get to know several other players over a computer network, using an instant message
style program.
 Complete a short game with each of them and rate them on several characteristics.
 Answer some questionnaires that ask about aspects of your own personality.
What are the risks and harms of participating in this study? This is a low-risk study and there
are no known harms to participating. The main risk to you is that you may feel uncomfortable
answering some of the questions on the questionnaires. If this occurs, you may skip those items.
What are the benefits of participating in this study? Other than that you might find it
interesting, there is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. However, your
participation might help us to understand how the social cues one person provides predict and
influence others’ behaviour.
How will participants’ information be kept confidential? All information that we obtain from
you is confidential. Questionnaire information and task results will be collected using a unique
participant code (below), which will never be linked to your name. These data will be collected
electronically and stored in password-protected, encrypted files for 5 years, per Western
University guidelines. While we do our best to protect your information, there is no guarantee
that we will be able to do so.
Usually it is only the research staff that will have access to the data. However,
representatives of The University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board may
require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the research. If study
results are published, no information that identifies you will be included.
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Can participants choose to leave the study? Participation in this study is voluntary. You are
free to withdraw from the study at any time and without penalty, even after the research has
concluded. You do not need to provide a reason. You may withdraw from the study by telling the
experimenter or by contacting Dr. Erin Heerey (eheerey@uwo.ca) and submitting your
participant code as it appears below. All data associated with your code will then be destroyed.
Are participants compensated for their time? This is a 1-hour study. If you are a Psychology
1000 student, you will receive 1.0 SONA credits for participating. If you are participating in the
context of a different class, you will receive compensation based on the information provided in
the course syllabus. If you have any questions about the compensation, please review your course
syllabus or contact the instructor.
Although it is not an aspect of the compensation per se, the game you will play after you
get to know the other players asks participants make decisions that affect how a pool of money is
shared. We will pay participants a small monetary bonus based on their decisions in the game.
Participants will earn between $3 and $7 depending on the outcome of their decisions.
What are the rights of participants? Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may
decide not to be involved. Even if you consent to participate, you have the right to not answer
individual questions or to withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose not to participate or
choose to leave the study, it will have no effect on your academic standing. If new information is
learned during the study that might affect your decision to stay in the study we will inform you of
this. You do not waive any legal right by consenting to the study.
Whom do participants contact for questions? If you would like more information, please
contact Dr. Erin Heerey via email (eheerey@uwo.ca) or phone (519) 661-2111 x 86917.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the
conduct of this study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email:
ethics@uwo.ca.
If you decide to participate, your participant code is: ________________________________
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the following
items:






I have read and understood the Letter of Information.
Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction.
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to provide a
reason for doing so.
I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to answer.
I consent to participate.

Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate.
Please keep this letter for future reference.

57

Experiment 3:
Project Title: Social cues in a chat-room environment 2
Document Title: Letter of information
Principal Investigator: Dr. Erin Heerey, PhD (eheerey@uwo.ca)
Invitation to Participate: You are being invited to participate in a research study investigating
how social cues in an online environment shape people’s later behaviour. You are being invited to
participate because you signed up for the study on SONA.
Why is this study being done? The purpose of this study is to understand how nonverbal social
cues affect the outcomes of social interactions.
How long will you be in this study? Participation takes about 1 hour and the session will take
place in the social psychology research rooms (6400 Block SSC).
What are the study procedures? If you decide to participate, we will ask you to:
 Get to know several other players over a computer network, using an instant message
style program.
 Complete a short game with each of them and rate them on several characteristics.
 Answer some questionnaires that ask about aspects of your own personality.
What are the risks and harms of participating in this study? This is a low-risk study and there
are no known harms to participating. The main risk to you is that you may feel uncomfortable
answering some of the questions on the questionnaires. If this occurs, you may skip those items.
What are the benefits of participating in this study? Other than that you might find it
interesting, there is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. However, your
participation might help us to understand how the social cues one person provides predict and
influence others’ behaviour.
How will participants’ information be kept confidential? All information that we obtain from
you is confidential. Questionnaire information and task results will be collected using a unique
participant code (below), which will never be linked to your name. These data will be collected
electronically and stored in password-protected, encrypted files for 5 years, per Western
University guidelines. While we do our best to protect your information, there is no guarantee
that we will be able to do so.
Usually it is only the research staff that will have access to the data. However,
representatives of The University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board may
require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the research. If study
results are published, no information that identifies you will be included.
Can participants choose to leave the study? Participation in this study is voluntary. You are
free to withdraw from the study at any time and without penalty, even after the research has
concluded. You do not need to provide a reason. You may withdraw from the study by telling the
experimenter or by contacting Dr. Erin Heerey (eheerey@uwo.ca) and submitting your
participant code as it appears below. All data associated with your code will then be destroyed.
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Are participants compensated for their time? This is a 1-hour study. If you are a Psychology
1000 student, you will receive 1.0 SONA credits for participating. If you are participating in the
context of a different class, you will receive compensation based on the information provided in
the course syllabus. If you have any questions about the compensation, please review your course
syllabus or contact the instructor.
What are the rights of participants? Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may
decide not to be involved. Even if you consent to participate, you have the right to not answer
individual questions or to withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose not to participate or
choose to leave the study, it will have no effect on your academic standing. If new information is
learned during the study that might affect your decision to stay in the study we will inform you of
this. You do not waive any legal right by consenting to the study.
Whom do participants contact for questions? If you would like more information, please
contact Dr. Erin Heerey via email (eheerey@uwo.ca) or phone (519) 661-2111 x 86917.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the
conduct of this study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email:
ethics@uwo.ca.
If you decide to participate, your participant code is: ________________________________
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the following
items:







I have read and understood the Letter of Information.
Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction.
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to provide a
reason for doing so.
I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to answer.
If I consent to participate, I promise that I will participate conscientiously and to the best
of my ability.
I consent to participate.

Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate.
Please keep this letter for future reference.
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Appendix B: Consent Procedure.
Studies 1 & 2a:
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the
following items:






I have read and understood the Letter of Information.
Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction.
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to
provide a reason for doing so.
I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to
answer.
I consent to participate.

Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate.
Studies 2b & 3:
When the computer program starts, you will be asked to affirm (say “yes” to) the
following items:







I have read and understood the Letter of Information.
Any questions I chose to ask have been answered to my satisfaction.
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and do not need to
provide a reason for doing so.
I understand that I am free to skip any questionnaire items that I do not wish to
answer.
If I consent to participate, I promise that I will participate conscientiously and to
the best of my ability.
I consent to participate.

Affirming these items indicates that you consent to participate.
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Appendix C: Getting Acquainted Questions.
1) Which type of book would you be most likely to choose for pleasure reading?
a) Literature
b) Romance
c) Mystery/Crime
d) Fantasy
2) Which colour do you prefer?
a) Green
b) Blue
c) Purple
d) Red
3) Which leisure activity do you prefer?
a) Watch TV/Movies
b) Read a book
c) Workout
d) Hang out with friends
4) Which cuisine do you prefer?
a) Chinese
b) Mexican
c) Japanese
d) Italian
5) What is your favourite sport?
a) Hockey
b) Basketball
c) Football
d) Tennis
6) Are you more of morning or an evening person?
a) Morning
b) Evening
7) Are you originally from Canada?
a) Yes
b) No
8) Do you live off campus or on campus?
a) On
b) Off
9) Do you like to cook?
a) Yes
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b) No
10) What continent would you most like to visit?
a) Europe
b) Australia
c) Africa
d) Asia
11) Do you prefer to go out and party or to relax at home?
a) Relax at home
b) Go out and party
12) What is your favourite season?
a) Winter
b) Spring
c) Summer
d) Fall
13) Would you rather read a book or watch a TV show?
a) Read a book
b) Watch a TV show
14) Do you prefer Macs or PCs?
a) Macs
b) PCs
15) What is your preferred social media site?
a) Facebook
b) Twitter
c) YouTube
d) Instagram
16) Would you most prefer a city vacation or a country vacation?
a) City
b) Country
17) Would you consider yourself a feminist?
a) Yes
b) No
18) What would you most like to be someday?
a) Doctor
b) Lawyer
c) Engineer
d) Entrepreneur
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19) Would you tend to see yourself as more liberal or more conservative?
a) Liberal
b) Conservative
20) Do you have a religious affiliation?
a) Yes
b) No
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Appendix D: Questionnaires
Ten-Item Personality Inventory:
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A Very Brief Measure of the
Big Five Personality Domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528.
For avatar- ratings: Here are a number of personality that may or may not apply to the
people you met. Please use the number keys to indicate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with each trait. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to
the person in the image below, even if you think one of the traits might apply more
strongly than the other. You may use the “9” key to skip an item.
1=

2=

3=

4= Neither

5= Agree

6= Agree

7= Agree

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree a

agree nor

a little

moderately

strongly

strongly

moderately

little

disagree

1) Extraverted, enthusiastic.
2) Critical, quarrelsome.
3) Dependable, self-disciplined.
4) Anxious, easily upset.
5) Open to new experiences, complex.
6) Reserved, quiet.
7) Sympathetic, warm.
8) Disorganized, careless.
9) Calm, emotionally stable.
10) Conventional, uncreative.
Additional items:
Experiments 1, 2, & 3:
11) Similar to me.
Experiments 2 & 3:
12) In sync with me.
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Appendix E: Trust Decision Task
1) Lend your car keys to
2) Believe lied to you about something
3) Ask for a character reference for a job from
4) Give your computer password to
5) Do a group project with
6) Believe intentionally gave you bad advice for an assignment
7) Let watch your pet while you are away
8) Give a spare house key to
9) Choose for a housemate
10) Lend $20 to
11) Let hand in an assignment on your behalf
12) Get class selection advice from
13) Ask to be your designated driver
14) Ask to take notes for you if you cannot make it to class.
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